

## Community resources

[Follow us on Twitter](#) [Check our Reddit](#) [Twitter this](#) [Digg this page](#) [Contact us on IRC](#)

*courage is contagious*

## Viewing cable 10STATE10900, S) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR CHINA ON THE

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the [structure of a cable](#) as well as how to [discuss them](#) with others. See also the [FAQs](#)

### Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

### Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#10STATE10900**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
<a href="#">10STATE10900</a>	<a href="#">2010-02-03 15:49</a>	<a href="#">2011-08-30 01:44</a>	<a href="#">SECRET</a>	<a href="#">Secretary of State</a>

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.malaysia-today.net/mtcolumns/40923-wikileaks-malaysia-based-firm-involved-in-guidance-systems-of-ballistic-missiles-cruise-missiles-and-unmanned-aerial-vehicles>

VZCZCXYZ0001  
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #0900 0341556  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
P 031549Z FEB 10  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0000  
INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 010900

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2035  
TAGS: [MTCRE](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [MNUC](#) [ETTC](#) [KSCA](#) [IR](#) [CH](#) [MY](#)  
SUBJECT: (S) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR CHINA ON THE  
MALAYSIA-BASED COMPANY ELECTRONICS COMPONENT LIMITED

REF: A. 09 STATE 130917  
[1](#)B. 09 BEIJING 003476

Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM, REASON: 1.4 (C).

[1](#)1. (U) This is an action request. Embassy Beijing, please see paragraph 4.

¶2. (S) Background/Objective: In December 2009, the United States shared with China information regarding attempts by the Malaysia-based firm Electronics Component Limited (ECL) to buy TRS-500 gyroscopes from the Chinese firm VibTel Industrial Co. Inc. (Ref A). These gyroscopes, which are controlled by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and China's missile-related export controls, would be suitable for use in the guidance systems of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles. We requested China investigate this information because ECL is associated with a network of Iranian-controlled front companies that procure sensitive goods on behalf of a number of Iranian entities of proliferation concern.

¶3. (S) Chinese officials agreed to investigate this information, but asked for additional details on ECL's relationships with firms in Iran (Ref B). To support their efforts in this case, we would like to inform them that ECL is part of a network of Iranian-controlled front companies that includes the Iranian firm Shahin Sefid Esta and the Malaysia-based front company Skylife Worldwide Sdn Bhd. This network procures sensitive goods on behalf of a number of Iranian entities of proliferation concern, including the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737-designated entities Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) and Ya Mahdi Industries. We want to provide this information to Chinese officials and emphasize that we believe the transfer of this controlled equipment to a company linked to UNSCR-designated entities would be prohibited pursuant to UNSCR 1737.

¶4. (S) Action Request: Request Embassy Beijing approach appropriate host government officials to deliver talking points/non-paper in paragraph 5 below and report response. Talking points also may be provided as a non-paper.

¶5. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper:

(SECRET//REL CHINA)

--In December 2009, we shared with you information regarding attempts by the Malaysia-based firm Electronics Component Limited (ECL) to buy TRS-500 gyroscopes from the Chinese firm VibTel Industrial Co. Inc.

--TRS-500 gyroscopes are controlled by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and China's missile-related export controls, and can be used in the guidance systems of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles.

--We also noted that ECL is associated with a network of Iranian-controlled front companies that procure sensitive goods on behalf of a number of Iranian entities of proliferation concern.

--In response to this information, you agreed to look into this matter, but asked if the United States could provide additional details on ECL's relationships with firms in Iran.

--We now want to provide you with additional information indicating that ECL is part of a network of Iranian-controlled front companies that includes the Iranian firm Shahin Sefid Esta and the Malaysia-based front company Skylife Worldwide Sdn Bhd.

--This network procures sensitive goods on behalf of a number of Iranian entities of proliferation concern, including the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG), which is Iran's primary developer of liquid propellant ballistic missiles, and Heavy Metal Industries, a front company for the tactical missile developer Ya Mahdi Industries.

--Both SHIG and Ya Mahdi Industries are sanctioned under United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737.

--Additionally, the TRS-500 gyroscopes are controlled items

that would be prohibited from being exported to Iran under UNSCR 1737.

--We hope this information is useful in supporting your efforts in this case and assists your ability to prevent the transfer of these gyroscopes by VibTel Industrial Co. to ECL.

--We look forward to future cooperation on nonproliferation issues and to hearing the results of your investigation into this activity at the earliest possible time.

End talking points/non-paper

¶6. (U) Washington POC is ISN/MTR John Paul Herrmann (Phone: 202-647-1430). Please slug any reporting on this issue for ISN/MTR and EAP/CM.

¶7. (U) A word version of this document will be posted at [www.state.sgov.gov/demarche](http://www.state.sgov.gov/demarche).  
CLINTON